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Abstract:  Intrusion Detection System (IDS) acts as a defensive tool to detect the security attacks on the web. IDS is a 
known methodology for detecting network-based attacks but is still immature in monitoring and identifying web-based 
application attacks. The objective of this research paper is to present a design methodology for efficient IDS with respect to 
web applications. In this paper, we present several specific aspects which make it challenging for an IDS to monitor and 
detect web attacks. The article also provides a comprehensive overview of the existing detection systems exclusively 
designed to observe web traffic. Furthermore, we identify various dimensions for comparing the IDS from different 
perspectives based on their design and functionalities. We also propose a conceptual framework of a web IDS with a 
prevention mechanism to offer systematic guidance for the implementation of the system. We compare its features with five 
existing detection systems, namely AppSensor, PHPIDS, ModSecurity, Shadow Daemon and AQTRONIX WebKnight. This 
paper will highly facilitate the interest groups with the cutting edge information to understand the stronger and weaker 
sections of the domain and provide a firm foundation for developing an intelligent and efficient system. 
Keywords: Web security, Web vulnerabilities, Web attacks, Intrusion Detection System, System Design 
1.     Introduction  
 
 There has been a phenomenal rise in the use of web-based applications over the last decade. Applications such as e-
banking, e-commerce, online blogs, social networking sites, etc. have become a common platform for transmitting information 
and delivering online services. Although web applications offer great digital experiences, only the secured ones can deliver the 
services safely. Since these applications deal with sensitive data and operations, for attackers they are an easy, lucrative and 
potential target to acquire confidential data, earn monetary gain and perform several unlawful activities [40, 36]. Nowadays, 
web application security is one of the pertinent issues in information security due to the continuous growth in the number of 
web attacks. According to the Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) 2017 [23], more than 76% of the scanned were found 
vulnerable. A survey reports that 60% of the hacker attacks either targeted the web applications or utilized them as the attack 
vectors. The latest report by Verizon [1] says 95% of the web application breaches are financially motivated
1
. Moreover, as per 
the report [87], the number of web-based security breaches in the first quarter of the year, 2017 has been increased by 35% 
from the previous year. 
Several defense mechanisms have been adopted by organizations to ensure adequate security for web applications. 
Web Application Firewall (WAF) [8] is the most prominent defense mechanism used by the organizations to protect the web 
application after the deployment.WAF first analyzes the web requests before they are sent to the web application and blocked 
if found malicious. It is, however, a sort of a generic product that operates by rules, and protects commonly known attack 
sequences but is insufficient to understand the context of custom web applications. Configuring WAF is like designing an 
alarm system for a building without considering the blueprint of the building. IDS, primarily designed to protect web 
applications is as a potential solution. IDS is the defense tool which is used to detect and report the intrusions to the 
administrator. IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) is the extension of IDS which is capable of responding to attack incidents and 
block if necessary. IPS works similar to WAF, but it can inspect in-depth traffic details to detect an attack. These tools offer a 
more dynamic solution than WAF as they can utilize both signature-based technique and anomaly-based technique for 
detecting known threats and identifying abnormal behavior respectively. They can learn the complex ecosystem of a web 
application such as how business logic works, who are the users, how they interact with the application and so on. 
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Intrusion detection methodology is still new in the domain of web application security. IDS are primarily designed to 
observe and detect intrusive activities on the network [27]. However, the characteristics of network-based attacks are 
significantly different from the web-based attacks. The former targets the network layer while the latter focuses on the 
application layer. Secondly, current web applications are complicated, database driven and usually created by developers with 
limited security skills. These applications are highly customized, provide dynamic content, facilitate interactive user sessions 
and conduct sophisticated business operations [30]. The attack surface varies with the respective business logic and skill set 
used to design these applications. Therefore, creating an IDS for recognizing suspicious activities on a website requires a 
significantly different approach than the IDS designed to monitor network traffic. 
The objective of the paper is to thoroughly understand and characterize the design methodology of the detection 
system exclusively built to monitor web traffic. In this paper, we discuss a number of unique characteristics of the web 
applications and its traffic which pose challenges to designing a web IDS and explain their effects concerning the design of 
IDS. It would highly facilitate the developers to craft an efficient architecture of the web IDS. The paper also presents a 
literature survey of research on IDS, proposed as a solution to web application security. It aims to explore the measures which 
have been suggested in existing studies to deal with the issues of web application security and identify the current state of the 
art and future perspectives. Based on the literature review, we recognized nine dimensions of detection systems to compare the 
existing systems. IDS tools are generally evaluated on performance metrics such as detection coverage and false-positive rates 
[94]. The identified dimensions assist in comparing the existing web IDS in terms of their design methodology and 
functionalities. The comparison provides useful information about the current state of IDS in web application security and 
several exciting trends and challenges of the domain. Besides, we also offer a conceptual framework of intrusion detection 
system with prevention mechanism (IPS) that offers systematic guidance of the design and implementation of a system for web 
applications. We compare its features with 5 well-known detection systems, namely AppSensor, PHPIDS, ModSecurity, 
Shadow Daemon and AQTRONIX WebKnight which highlight the strength and additional functionalities of the proposed 
framework. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes major approaches for detecting intrusions. Section 3 
highlights several features of web applications and its traffic which are highly responsible for the performance of IDS. Section 
4 provides a glimpse of security measures offered by IDS to prevent web-based attacks. Section 5 throws light on a 
comprehensive literature survey conducted to explore various intrusion detection systems proposed by researchers for web 
applications.  Section 6 introduces the nine identified dimensions of web IDS for comparing the existing systems. In section 7, 
the current state and associated challenges have been highlighted in the form of a graph. Section 8 explains the conceptual 
framework of web IPS and compare it with the five other detection systems. Finally, section 9 concludes the paper followed by 
a brief outline on the future direction in section 10. 
2.     Intrusion Detection Approaches  
There are major four approaches towards intrusion detection, namely misuse, anomaly, policy and hybrid. Each 
detection approach works on a specific set of principles. The current section briefly states the mechanism of each detection 
technique along with the challenges faced by them. 
 
       2.1. Misuse-based Intrusion Detection  
 
 The misuse-based approach uses a set of signatures representing the patterns of already known attacks to filter 
malicious activities. Misuse-based systems (also known as signature-based systems) have the capability of detecting known 
attacks more precisely with less false positive rate but prove to be inefficient for detecting zero-day or unknown ones. The 
signature database should be up to date for recognizing novel attacks which is quite tedious and intensive process since new 
attacking techniques are being frequently discovered [23]. Another issue arises because of the vulnerabilities caused due to the 
in-house developed web applications. Such vulnerabilities demand an expert knowledge for creating signatures specific to 
custom vulnerabilities other than common vulnerabilities. Next challenge arises due to the existence of infinite variants of 
attack vectors. A slight change in attack vector might easily fool the signature-based detector. Therefore, signatures should be 
general enough to cover these variants. However, there exists a trade-off between deciding their specificity and sensitivity level. 
Sensitive (general) signatures amplify the risk of getting high false positive alerts while selective (specific) ones fail in 
detecting attack variants. 
 
      2.2. Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection 
 
The anomaly-based technique assumes that malicious activities are significantly different from expected behavior, 
and that can be studied quantitatively. The incoming events are analyzed to check whether they deviate from the normal ones. 
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Unlike misuse, anomaly-based systems support detection of unknown and novel attacks and can also be trained to cater the 
problems caused by the custom vulnerabilities. Besides having great potential, there are some critical issues associated with the 
approach. Anomaly-based components can model the acceptable behavior by using the multitude of different machine learning 
techniques [37], and selecting best ones is a significant issue. Also, deciding the optimal thresholds of the machine learning 
parameters is challenging. The high threshold value may increase the number of undetected attacks whereas too lenient 
configuration may cause higher false positive alerts.  However, the solution depends upon the variability of the behavior being 
observed. If the web traffic is highly variable, the generalized model can handle the situation better while low variable traffic 
requires a strict model to detect doubtful movement. Anomaly-based systems are also known for producing high false positive 
rates which may cause blocking or denying of a good number of legitimate requests. The assumption (i.e., attacks manifest 
unusual behavior) behind the approach is the prime reason since at times a benign user does exhibit strange behavior which 
might not have been recorded during the training phase. 
 
      2.3. Policy-based Intrusion Detection 
 
The two discussed techniques suffer from their inherent limitations. Misuse detection can never maintain data of all 
possible attack vectors, and likewise, anomaly detection cannot record all legitimate behaviors of users. An alternative 
approach, namely policy-based intrusion detection is receiving considerable attention these days as it allows to overcome these 
limitations. Policy-based techniques establish boundaries between the allowed and not allowed events by imposing a set of 
rules [26]. It solves two major problems: (1) detection of unknown attacks, (2) classification of normal unseen behavior into  
attack class. Although this approach seems useful and flexible but there are also certain drawbacks associated with it. First, a 
security specialist is required to design effective policies. Second, defined policies should be consistent and in a logically 
correct state throughout the system to avoid any adverse circumstances. Policies are inter-related through their associated 
conditions, and therefore, there may exist inter or intra-policy conflicts as an incoming event may trigger more than one rule 
either within a policy or between two policies. Moreover, these policies are usually implemented sequentially, and improper 
ordering can cause a feedback loop or deadlock situation. However, ontology-based systems [3-5] can be used to simplify the 
policy specification and management tasks. 
 
      2.4. Hybrid Intrusion Detection  
 
A hybrid system is the fusion of different intrusion detection approaches into a single integrated detection system [38, 
45]. Hybrid based systems give better performance by utilizing the strength of more than one approach to overcome the 
limitations of individual techniques. However, while incorporating the different methods, a few things should be taken into 
consideration. First, hybrid systems can have either a layered or parallel architecture but opting one of them is a preliminary 
requirement.  Moreover, in layered architecture deciding the correct sequence of multiple components for processing events is 
another challenge. For example, the authors in work [45] proposed the hybrid system where the anomaly detection component 
is placed first followed by the misuse component. The second point to be considered is how to resolve the conflicts between 
results classified by these components since there may be the case when one classifies an event into a safe class, and other 
declares the same as an intrusive [46]. 
Each of the detection techniques has both strengths and weaknesses. Misuse detection technique generates less false-
positive alarms but may miss an attack if the respective pattern is not stored in the database. Similarly, the anomaly-based 
mechanism is capable enough to recognize novel attacks but causes high false-positive rates as it is inefficient in differentiating 
the malicious from unknown legitimate behavior. Logically, the misuse-based approach uses knowledge of malicious behavior 
(known attacks), and anomaly-based approach uses knowledge of normal behavior. Meanwhile, policy-based approach tries to 
set equilibrium between normal and malicious behavior via enforcing the set of rules. It therefore seems to be a more viable 
detection system but inter- and intra-policy relationships cumbersome the whole policy management task. And the last 
detection technique, the hybrid approach is aimed towards utilizing the potential of multiple methods in such a way that the 
strength of other overcomes the weakness of one. However, the fact that how well the different components are integrated 
determines the performance of hybrid-based systems. 
In the next section, we are discussing the peculiarities of web applications and its traffic which profoundly affect the 
performance of IDS.   Knowledge of these features would significantly help the upcoming researchers to develop a sound 
understanding of the detection system and design an efficient framework. 
3.     Challenges in Intrusion detection for web applications 
Intrusion detection methodology is still immature in web application security domain. The detection systems are 
primarily used as a network security appliance. However, designing the web IDS requires a different approach from the 
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traditional network IDS for handling the complexities associated with web-based applications. In this section, we discuss 
several characteristics of web application and web traffic which make the process of developing the IDS a challenging task. 
The characteristics explained in the following subsections underlie the theoretical basis for designing the web IDS and will 
assist in having a thorough grasp of the basic knowledge required to create a robust architecture of the system. 
 
      3.1. Communication Protocol (HTTP/HTTPS) 
 
Attackers exclusively make use of HTTP/HTTPS protocols to exploit the web application vulnerabilities. Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [9] is a request-response protocol designed to facilitate communication between the client and 
server, and HTTPS [39] ensures the secure and encrypted connection. When HTTPS traffic is observed from the IDS 
perspective, one significant disadvantage is that encryption blindfolds the network-based detection systems. IDS can be 
characterized into Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) and Network-Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) on 
the basis of whether they operate on an Application layer or Internet layer of TCP/IP model [20]. NIDS monitors the network 
packets, and in HTTPS communication, the packet data exists in the encrypted form which fails the system to inspect it. 
However, these systems can check HTTPS traffic if they have access to the private key of the SSL certificate. On the contrary, 
HIDS does not face any problem in dealing with HTTPS traffic as they protect endpoints where encrypted information is 
decrypted back into the normal form.   
 
 3.2. Web Request  
 
Web request carries data from the client to the server. The data is passed using either HTTP request header fields or 
request parameters [34]. Request header fields contain control information of the client request while the request parameters 
include additional user information required by server-side programs to conduct an operation. GET and POST are the two 
standard methods used to pass parameters to the server [34]. In the GET request, parameter values are passed in the query 
string of URL, and in the POST request, these values are carried in the request body. Client browser generally sets header 
fields whereas the parameter values are either provided by the user or were already initialized by server-side programs (e.g., 
cookies, hidden fields, etc.). The fundamental problem with web-based application security is, the data provided by clients can 
be highly variable and equally complex, and therefore it becomes complicated to bind them by a valid set of values.   
The primary role of detection systems revolves around observing the values provided in the header fields and request 
parameters. These values can be validated using either positive or negative approach. Positive validation approach defines 
what data is expected by the application.  It consists of several types of validation checks such as data type (string, integer), 
minimum and maximum length, specific patterns, etc. On the other hand, the negative approach involves filtration of values 
which contain the attack patterns. Ontology and signature-based systems include both positive (white-listing) and negative 
(black-listing) validation while the anomaly based systems are concerned with positive validations only. The data passed in a 
web request consists of a variety of values, and the choice of selecting an appropriate approach (white-list or black-list) 
depends significantly on the type of value set. We have categorized the value set into following classes. 
 
      3.2.1 Finite Values: These values exist in a finite range and can be either independent of application‟s business logic (i.e., 
common to all) or specific to it. Former group contains a set of common values, for example, header fields like Accept, 
Accept-Charest, Accept-Language, etc. These values are mostly the same for different applications, and so can be validated 
against a general white-list in SIDS. The latter category includes parameters which contain values of HTML controls like 
dropdown lists, check-boxes, etc. These controls are used to assist clients to choose values from the given set only. The value 
set of these parameters depends on the business logic of an application. Maintaining the white-list to validate such parameter 
values can be turned into a tedious task for SIDS due to many reasons. Primarily, the whitelist is no longer the general enough 
but rather, is specific to the set of values corresponds to the business logic. Second, this list can be reasonably long depending 
upon the number of controls in an application. Third, maintenance of the list is a complicated process since allowed set of 
values may get modified promptly with the change in the business logic. However, AIDS can work well in this scenario since 
it is capable of learning the values of the parameters automatically [53]. 
 
3.2.2 Fixed format values: As the name suggests, these values follow a specific format, e.g., parameters which carry 
values like date, time, etc. To analyze these values, one can make use of either AIDS by learning the character distribution and 
structure of these values [53] or whitelist of SIDS by defining the pattern of allowed values. 
 
      3.2.3 Application values: This class represents the values which are given by server-side programs and must not be 
tampered at the client side. Developers store a variety of essential information like price and quantity of products, session id, 
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etc. in the form of cookies, hidden fields or query strings. IDS need to ensure that these values are same as set by the 
application. Signature-based IDS seem to be inefficient in recognizing tampered values as these systems demand an attack 
pattern, and tampered values usually appear as similar to a normal data. However, anomaly-based systems can be used to learn 
the parameters whose values should not be altered at the client-side. The work presented in [49] encountered the parameter 
tampering attacks. 
 
      3.2.4 Infinite and complex values: The parameters such as username and password in a login form or user comments on 
a blog carry plaintext data. These parameters mostly have an arbitrary set of values, and therefore, are generally validated 
against known attack patterns specified in a signature blacklist.  
 
       3.3. Multiple users with multiple roles 
 
  Web applications are usually accessed by multiple users with different level of privileges [29], and these privileges 
are controlled by the authorization process which ensures that the user is performing only permissible operations. Applications 
use session management mechanism [28] to track an individual client-server interaction and map the request to a particular 
user for deciding whether the request should be processed or denied. A session ID is associated whenever a user login to the 
application for distinguishing the series of requests from the request pool and link them to the logged in user.  
 Facilitating different users with a different set of privileges imposes several demands on the detection systems. 
Primarily, IDS must have the functionality to track user sessions to link the client requests to their specified session. Second, 
the system should also have the capability to monitor the integrity of a session for ensuring whether the session is being used 
by the same person who logged into the system. There are various ways to take over sessions illegitimately like session 
hijacking and session fixation [28]. The third demand says IDS should also perform continuous monitoring of resource usage 
and user activities within a session. A well-formulated privilege escalation attack can lead to the unauthorized access, which 
may even allow the attacker to gain administrator privileges.  “Stateful Analysis” is the necessary feature required by any IDS 
to satisfy these demands. This feature assists the IDS to track the state of an individual session. While stateless IDS treats every 
request independent of each other and do not maintain any track of requests [46], [47], the stateful mechanism can correlate the 
sequence of requests to a specific user [48], [50]. Systems which do not possess any mechanism to map the current request 
with previously arrived requests are unlikely to recognize exploitation against state maintenance and authorization. 
 
      3.4. Continuous Changes 
 
Like any software development life cycle, web applications also need maintenance and demand continuous 
modifications for adding new functionalities, absorbing new technologies, etc [100]. Depending upon the application domain, 
these changes may be either frequent or regular. Applications like e-commerce and social networking sites continuously evolve 
to enhance user experience and engage more users towards them
2
, whereas those web applications which are basically 
designed to mark the organization presence online rarely change. 
The continuous changes made to an application over time introduce a major challenge to IDS. The detection systems 
also need to be tuned and maintained with time to accommodate changes made in an application. In the context of anomaly 
detector, frequent changes handicap the system in a sense that the present model is unaware of the modified version of the 
application. Apparently, it would misclassify new legitimate behavior as an intrusive. These detectors require retraining to 
adapt the changes [42]. Likewise in the case of policy-based systems, the rules should be re-defined to incorporate the changes. 
However, in the signature-based system, the blacklist is not much affected since attack patterns remain the same, but the 
whitelist needs to be updated with respect to the changed behavior of the application. 
 
      3.5. Dynamicity 
 
The web application consists of a mixture of static and dynamic web pages.  Static implies constant, a web page that 
presents the exact contents before users as it is stored at the server side. Whereas dynamic pages include web pages whose 
content is generated on-the-fly by server-side or client-side languages, mostly based on the parameter values passed in an 
HTTP request. Dynamicity profoundly affects the performance of intrusion detection systems. For static pages, there exists a 
deterministic relationship between the user requests and the content to be displayed on the browser [13]. Requests for static 
pages do not require any specific data from the user which significantly simplifies the task of IDS. On the other hand, dealing 
with dynamic web pages is the main challenge faced by intrusion detection systems. Dynamic web services usually need 
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parameters from client side for processing, and this feature is highly exploited by attackers to hack into a website. Dynamicity 
complicates the job of IDS, the more the dynamicity the more is challenging for IDS to detect intruders.  
 
        3.6. Heterogeneity 
 
            The web application can be implemented using various server-side languages, such as PHP, Java, Perl, etc. NIDS are 
independent of languages, and hence same IDS can be deployed for different server-side language applications. On the other 
hand, HIDS is language specific and can be designed either general or specific to a particular language. For example, Snort is 
an open source NIDS used to detect web-based attacks for any application [33], and PerlIDS is a host-based IDS used to 
protect web applications implemented in the Perl language
3
. 
 
      3.7. Bot Requests  
 
The web traffic can also be generated by bots rather than humans. Bots are automated scripts which are designed to 
execute a set of specific activities on websites. These scripts can be of two types. First, scripts which are designed to mimic 
certain human behavior [95] like automating clicks on online ads (click fraud), submitting forms, flooding the websites with 
millions of requests to perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, etc. Second, the scripts which are designed to launch web 
attacks such as Angler, RIG and Neutrino attack toolkits [23], [32]. Scripts can perform tasks faster than manual without 
requiring much human involvement. Existing attack toolkits provide several additional benefits over manual attacks. These 
toolkits assemble several attack techniques in a single package and assist the novice attackers with the ability to mount attacks 
on websites in a relatively more straightforward way. The attacker can use the toolkit to exploit the vulnerabilities without in-
depth technical knowledge. Furthermore, automated attacks are comparatively cheaper than manual attacks since they allow 
adversaries to target a large number of websites with less time and effort [31]. 
Signature-based systems are not sound enough to recognize requests from the scripts designed to mimic the user 
activities because malicious requests differ from the legitimate ones in intent but not in content, and SIDS operates on 
malicious content rather than intent. However, the adversary can be caught using anomaly-based IDS from several abnormal 
behavioral features. For example, automated tools usually generate web requests at a higher frequency than the regular rate of 
requests, and this extreme change in request behavior can easily be recognized by AIDS [53]. On the other hand, automated 
attacks can be best handled by SIDS since the scripts use common attack vectors to target the vulnerabilities [59]. 
In the section, we discussed several particular features of web application and its traffic that would play a crucial role 
while designing the framework of an IDS. A quick snapshot of the impact of features on IDS is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Challenges of web IDS 
Characteristics of web 
application and its traffic 
Impact on IDS 
Communication Protocol 
(HTTP/HTTPS) 
 
 HTTP communication is carried out in plain text whereas HTTPS 
communication is encrypted. 
 NIDS fails in analyzing HTTPS traffic whereas HIDS can handle both 
HTTP and HTTPS. 
 
Web request  Web requests carry a variety of parameters. 
 Detection approach highly relies on the type of the values of parameters. 
e.g.  
                     Business logic independent finite values: whitelist approach of SIDS 
                     Business logic dependent finite values: anomaly-based approach 
                     Fixed format values: the anomaly-based approach or whitelist 
approach                
                     of SIDS 
                     Application initialized values: the anomaly-based approach 
                     Parameters carrying text data: the blacklist approach of SIDS 
 
Multiple users with multiple 
roles 
 
 Web applications facilitate multiple user interactions through sessions and 
provide access rights based on user role. 
 Stateless IDSs are not efficient enough to recognize attacks on session 
management and authorization policies. 
 Stateful detection mechanism overcomes the limitation of stateless IDS as 
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it can track and monitor an individual user session. 
 
Continuous Change 
 
 Continuous modifications in application source code directly affect the 
efficiency of IDS. 
 AIDS requires retraining to accommodate the changes. 
 Blacklist-based SIDS is not much affected. 
 
Dynamicity  
 
 The web application consists of static and dynamic web pages. 
 The more the dynamic content, the more is the challenging task for IDS 
Heterogeneity 
 
 Web Applications can be implemented using different server-side 
languages. 
 NIDS is independent of programming language whereas HIDS can be 
designed either general or specific to a particular language. 
 
Automated Requests (Bots) 
 
 Scripts can also be designed to issue HTTP requests automatically. 
 SIDS suits best for detecting scripts designed to automate web-based 
attacks. 
 AIDS suits best for detecting scripts designed to mimic human behavior. 
 
AIDS: Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System         SIDS: Signature-based Intrusion Detection System 
 
4.    IDS Security  
Web vulnerabilities are the weaknesses of a web application that allow a user to execute malicious operations. 
OWASP Top Ten Project [88] is dedicated to providing the list of prevalent and critical web application vulnerabilities. In 
order to secure web applications, intrusion detection systems provide various kinds of security measures to guard them against 
adversaries. Following subsections present a brief overview of different security features incorporated by IDS to identify the 
suspicious user activities. 
 
       4.1. Input Validation 
 
The core problem with the insecure web applications is the fact that users have full control over the data to be 
submitted to the server. They can supply any arbitrary input into the parameters including header fields, or may even modify 
the values stored by the application at the client side in the form of hidden fields, cookies and URL parameters. A large 
proportion of applications rely on client side measures to control the user data, which, however, attackers can easily 
circumvent. From the security perspective, every piece of data received from the user should be treated as potentially malicious, 
and thoroughly verified at the server. Improper or no input validation at the server side is the root cause behind most of the 
web application vulnerabilities including XSS, SQL Injection, unvalidated redirects, etc. [25]. Input Validation is the key 
security feature provided by almost every detection system. Validation process performs checks if the input satisfies a 
predefined set of rules for preventing any entry of unsafe data into the application. It comprises checking all input parameters 
including URLs, form data, cookies and query strings. 
 
      4.2. Output Validation 
 
HTTP response is generated as an output of the client request processed by the server.  It contains a series of header 
fields and a message body. Generally, output validation guards an application against unintentional revealing of sensitive 
information. The application may reveal critical information in the form of cookies or hidden fields in an insecure way. For 
example, if “secure” flag in the cookie is not set by the application code while sending the credentials over HTTPS, the 
browser can transmit the credentials stored in the cookie over unencrypted HTTP channel. The application may also expose 
internal details if it does not handle the errors messages. For instance, error based exploitation is one of the SQL injection 
techniques used by a hacker to extract information from the database. There are detection systems which also verify the 
response data, and ensure that no potential harmful content is sent to the client in an insecure way. They mostly modify the 
content of the HTTP response to serve the purpose.     
 
4.3. Session Verification 
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Almost every application requires some mechanism to associate incoming application requests to their specific users 
for facilitating client-server interaction in the form of sessions. Since HTTP is a stateless protocol, a Session ID (randomly 
generated alphanumeric string) is associated with each user request to keep track of his activities within a session.  A large 
fraction of web attacks involves session hijacking, session fixation, session replay where an attacker steals or overwrites users' 
Session ID to impersonate the valid user and perform operations on his behalf [24, 84]. Session verification offered by IDS 
ensures that whether the session is being used by the same user who logged into the application. It may also include detecting 
any attempt being made by an adversary to get the session ID illegitimately. 
 
    4.4. Access Control 
 
Access control defines the policies to regulate the privileges granted to the application user. Web applications serve 
multiple users with the different privileges which are usually given on the basis of their role (e.g., visitor, manager, admin, etc.).  
Some detection systems also provide the functionality of monitoring the activities of the clients to prevent any unauthorized 
access to the information or services offered by the application. The systems may also detect those requests that attempt to 
unauthorized access to the objects (e.g., files and directories) which are mistakenly exposed via URL or form parameter
4
. For 
example, an online publishing site may allow its users to purchase e-books by directing him to the download link once he 
makes the payment. In the case of improper access control verification, if the user already knows the link, he can access the 
resource without payment. 
 
4.5. Bot Detection 
 
Intrusion Detection System is also capable of differentiating the normal user requests from the requests generated by 
some software. A script can be created to either automate human activities on the web such as mouse clicks, keyboard strokes, 
etc. or launch web attacks including injection attacks, Dos attacks and brute force attacks. However, IDS should also have the 
potential to distinguish between good bots and bad bots. Good bots are those automated programs which are beneficial for the 
service provider, such as search engine bots which help in improving the ranking of a website. 
In this section, we briefly discussed the security features provided by the IDS to prevent malicious activities on a 
website. Table 2 presents the list of web vulnerabilities which are covered by the different security measures. 
 
Table 2  Web vulnerabilities and security measures 
Security Measures Web Vulnerabilities 
 
Input Validation Injection, cross-site scripting and unvalidated redirects and forwards 
Output Validation Injection, sensitive data exposure and using components with known vulnerabilities 
 
Access Control Broken authentication and session management, insecure direct object reference, security 
misconfiguration and missing function level access control  
Session Verification Broken authentication and session management and cross-site request forgery 
 
Bot Detection 
 
Insufficient monitoring mechanism 
5.    IDS as Web Application Defence Mechanism 
The section presents a systematic literature survey to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the 
intrusion detection systems in web application security. We study how the major approaches to intrusion detection have been 
utilized to deal with the complexities and issues of web applications, and what measures have been suggested to encounter the 
pitfalls associated with the detection approaches. Moreover, based on the review, a number of dimensions have been suggested 
to compare the existing systems and illuminate several pertinent facts. 
 
      5.1. Signature-based Detection Systems 
 
As discussed in section 2.1, Signature-based systems detect intrusions by using the knowledge of existing attacks. 
However, the data being monitored can vary. For instance, the SIDS presented in study [52] analyses log entries to recognize 
malicious activities on the web server. The authors of the paper [48] showcase WebSTAT, an intrusion detection system based 
on STAT framework [11] which can monitor both logs and HTTP requests. The system relies on state transition analysis 
                                                 
4
 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A4-Insecure_Direct_Object_References 
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model to describe the attack scenarios and is also capable of detecting multi-step attacks. Moreover, besides being a misuse-
based system, it permits detection of attacks variant which is similar to the specified malicious behavior. The authors in study 
[56] address the issue of manually writing the attack patterns by automating the whole process. The proposed work primarily 
makes use of text mining techniques to learn the behavior of both benign and malicious user from the web log file and generate 
the attack model. 
 
      5.2. Anomaly-based Detection Systems 
 
The earliest work we came across in the literature that presented anomaly-based system which exclusively focuses 
on detecting web-based attacks is from Kruegel et al. [47]. In this paper, the authors have built multiple anomaly models to 
characterize the relationship between server-side programs, client-side parameters, and the corresponding parameter values. 
Several studies including [42], [51] and [53] used their work as the base for their research. In a study [53], authors introd uce 
further features to capture more granular request behavior such as the number of times a program is invoked by the client 
(access frequency), if the requests are issued by an automated source (inter-request time) or if the client has bypassed any 
functionality (invocation order). In study [62], authors have presented the classification learning scheme to identify 
malicious behavior. In the classification scheme, the data of both the malicious as well as benign data is gathered to train 
the classifier. Research in a paper [65] has shown how DFA (Deterministic Finite Automata) can be used as an anomaly-
based strategy to learn normal request behavior. Since user requests are highly variable in content, many transformation 
rules have been applied to these requests to reduce their variability. The transformation process reduced the complexity of 
the DFA model. Another technique, namely n-gram [7] is also seen as a promising technique to detect anomalies since it 
can analyze the structure of requests. However, the complexity of the n-gram modeling technique rises exponentially with 
the increasing size of the gram. The authors in study [64] proposed Spectrogram model that incorporates Markovian 
property to reduce the complexity of n-gram-based technique. Markovian property assumes the probability of future states 
depends solely on the present state. In one more study [60], the authors have used a group of Hidden Markov Model for 
detecting attacks related to the input validation. Authors in this paper have explicitly handled the problem of  noisy data in 
the training set, which was earlier not focused by the researchers. The article [63] conducted a comparative analysis of two 
most promiscuous anomaly-based detection algorithms, DFA and N-grams based on their effectiveness and efficiency.  
Some researchers have also attempted to introduce the context knowledge into the anomaly-based detector. For 
example, the study in paper [57] adds the notion of a context-aware anomaly detection system by incorporating the 
structural information of HTTP protocol into the technique. One-class support vector machine (OC-SVM) [16] has been 
used to build the anomaly detection model. The study [43] further carried the context-aware anomaly detection approach by 
presenting an innovative method for representing the packet payload using contextual n-grams (cn-grams). The cn-grams 
technique allows integration of structural properties of protocol and their respective byte sequences in a unified feature 
space. Furthermore, the concept of feature shading [2] has been presented to visualize anomalies which help to localize 
suspicious pattern and recognize the cause of an anomaly. Authors in work [51] have addressed one of the limitations of the 
anomaly-based approach, i.e., being inefficient in providing attack description. 
Anomaly-based models are known for producing high false positive alerts, which took the attention of several 
researchers. Authors in paper [10] have proposed the idea of data compartmentalization to mitigate the problem of false 
alerts caused due to the requests which are anomalous but benign. Instead of following “all or nothing” methodology in 
which every anomalous request is treated as malicious, the requests are categorized on the basis of their anomaly score. 
Clients are given limited access (or no access) to the resources as per the category assigned to the requests. For example, the 
highly unusual request will be forwarded to the server that has no privilege to access the sensitive information. The same 
work is further extended in research [54] by serially integrating the web-based anomaly system with a database anomaly 
component. An IDS named Double Guard is proposed in paper [13] that considers both user requests arriving at the web 
server and database requests at the back-end to track the malicious requests. The system built the model by mapping client 
requests to their respective database queries. TokDoc [58], one more IDS is incorporated with automatic malicious request 
repairing mechanism. This innovative idea provides the ability to replace the suspicious section of the request with a safe 
value learned during the training phase. The TokDok is equipped with four healing strategies to deal with anomalous values: 
drop the token, encode the doubtful values, replace it with the most frequent values and change it to its nearest neighbor 
value. SWADDLER is another anomaly-based detection suggested by the authors in the study [50] which observes the 
internal state of the application by profiling the server side program variables. The approach is more g ranular as compared 
to the rest because it analyzes the different states of an application within a session while the attack is being performed. A 
similar approach, namely RRABIDS (Ruby on Rails Anomaly-Based Detection System Intrusion) [49] uses invariant logic 
to monitor the internal state of the application and recognize anomalies. The approach identifies a set of constraints on the  
internal variables which are dependent on the input values provided by clients.  
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There are several types of research in the literature which have exclusively focused on finding the solution to the 
issue arises in AIDS due to frequent changes in a web application. The work presented in paper [42] solves the problem of 
the higher number of false alerts raised when the application gets modified. The authors developed an innovative technique 
to automatically recognize the legitimate changes and selectively re-train the specific portion of the anomaly model. The 
work [44] is also dedicated to deal with the changes made in an application. To tackle the changes made in the application, 
the author applies transductive on-line learning property to build the model which is independent of the training set and 
improves over time. 
 
      5.3. Policy-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Researchers primarily use policy-based techniques because of their ability to set an equilibrium between allowed and 
not allowed events. Authors in the study [55] integrated a policy based Generic Authorization and Access control API (GAA-
API) framework into an IDS to make the system more capable of identifying an unauthorized operation. The framework 
implements an Extended Access Control List (EACL) language [19] to specify security policies for monitoring resource access 
and performing actions in response to any threatening activity. Authors in the study [18] have focused on the ontological 
model as a new breed of IDS and highlighted two ontology models, namely protocol-centric and attack centric model to 
identify malicious requests. Protocol ontology model provides the baseline on which the security measures of the attack model 
are constructed. The model assists the system with inference and reasoning ability to map different scenarios of security 
breaches to a general semantic rule. It reduces the number of signatures in detection process. The authors in paper [14] further 
extends the work by using ontology engineering practices to design the system. Another study [17] embeds the Bayesian filter 
in an ontology-based system to mitigate the web attacks. The model includes both benign and malicious data in training to 
enhance the detection ability of the system. 
 
      5.4. Hybrid Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
This section highlights the work on hybrid-based web IDS by different researchers so far. An intelligent Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) proposed in paper [45] combines the anomaly-based and signature-based detection 
approaches along with additional response action mechanism to handle the intruders. The authors incorporate the DREAD 
model to estimate the threat risks and design the response policies according to the severity level. The IDS presented in [46] 
provides an architecture that leverages the strengths of both techniques (anomaly and signature) in such a manner that it gives 
the advantage of categorizing the events into safe, intrusive or unknown class (i.e., the class for which events neither qualify as 
an attack, nor  as safe). Another hybrid detection approach presented in work [59] utilizes the features of the attacks performed 
by script kiddies. The misuse-based component of the system uses attack patterns provided by several web applications which 
participate collaboratively in the detection process. The web applications create a list of requests that they categorized as 
harmful and later on forward it to other cooperating web applications to enhance the detection process. The proposed system 
uses the weighted graph to recognize the anomalies.  
Table 3 summarizes the contributions of various researchers towards intrusion detection systems designed particularly 
for securing web applications. 
Table 3  Summary of existing intrusion detection systems designed to secure web applications 
IDS Contributions 
Almgren et al., 2000 [52] Presented a module-based SIDS. 
Kruegel and Giovanni, 2003 [47] Proposed AIDS exclusively for monitoring web application. 
Used statistical modeling techniques to profile features of request parameters. 
Vigna et al., 2003 [48] Proposed WebSTAT- an SIDS which is based on the STAT framework. 
Specified attack scenarios in terms of states and transitions. 
Ryotov et al., 2003 [55] Integrated Access Control module to IDS 
Proposed Generic Authorization and Access-control API (GAA-API) to identify 
an unauthorized operation 
Tombini et al., 2004 [46] Proposed HIDS by combining anomaly and misuse detection approach. 
Categorized the requests into 3 classes, namely safe, intrusive and unknown 
class. 
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Kruegel et al., 2005 [53] Extended the work presented in [47] by providing three additional features to 
profile the relationship between requests. 
Robertson et al., 2006) [51] Overcame the limitation of AIDS approaches of insufficiency in providing attack 
description 
Used generalization technique and regular expressions to group anomalies and 
infer attack classes respectively. 
Valeur et al., 2006 [71] Proposed the concept of data compartmentalization to reduce false positives in 
AIDS. 
User requests are handled based on their anomaly scores. 
Adeva and Atxa, 2007) [56] Proposed text mining based SIDS. 
Automated the process of signature creation using text categorization. 
Cova et al., 2007 [50] Proposed characterization of the internal state of the web application to detect 
anomalies. 
Used both multivariate and univariate models for profiling. 
Ingham et. al., 2007 [65] DFA modeling has been used in anomaly detection method 
Applied several heuristics measures to anomalous requests to reduce false 
positives.  
Dussel et al., 2008 [57] Incorporated the concept of HTTP protocol into anomaly detection technique.  
Adopted one-class support vector machine (OC-SVM) to build the AIDS. 
Park et al., 2008 [12] Used Needleman-Wunsch algorithm [15] from bioinformatics to build the AIDS. 
Maggi et al., 2009 [42] Proposed AIDS that deals with continuous changes in a web application. 
Used HTTP Response data to detect changes. 
Vigna et al., 2009 [54] Integrated web-based and database-based anomaly detection systems 
Song et al., 2009 [64] Proposed factorized n-gram Markov technique based AIDS that reduces the 
complexity in n-gram method. 
Corona et al.,2009 [60] Used Hidden Markov technique to build AIDS.  
Explicitly dealt with noise in training data. 
Razzaq et al., 2009 [17]  The Bayesian filter is applied to ontology system to mitigate web application 
attacks. 
Kruegel et al., 2010 [58] Presented several healing strategies to recover malicious requests. 
Replaced suspicious section in a request with benign data on the basis of 
previously trained anomaly detectors. 
Corona et al., 2010 [61] Extended the work proposed in the study [60] by using statistical models along 
with HMM model to enhance detection efficiency. 
Used clustering technique to identify anomalies. 
Lin et al., 2010 [63] Performed comparative analysis on two promiscuous anomaly-based detection 
algorithms, namely  DFA and N-grams in terms of effectiveness and efficiency 
Lampesberger et al., 2011 [44] Addressed the tendency of continuous changes in web application 
Introduced transductive on-line strategy to train AIDS. 
Ludinard et al., 2012 [49] Proposed invariant based anomaly detection model. 
Focused on monitoring of violations of the internal state of application 
Lee et al., 2012 [13] Used container-based architecture in AIDS. 
Mapped HTTP requests to database queries. 
Wressnegger et al., 2013 [62] Performed comparative analysis on two learning schemes, namely classification 
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and anomaly detection. 
Also defined criteria for selecting the appropriate scheme. 
Alazab et al., 2014 [45] Built IIDPS by embedding SIDS with AIDS. 
Proposed active response strategy using fuzzy logic 
Used DREAD model to assess the risk associated with alerts. 
Razzaq et al., 2014 [18] Proposed semantic-based approach that uses ontologies to detect web-based 
attacks 
Provided protocol-based and attack-based ontology model 
Razzaq et al., 2014 [14] Suggested how ontology-engineering practices could be applied to design 
ontology-based systems. 
Duessel et al., 2016 [43] Modelled context-aware anomaly detection system by using cn-gram method.  
Marek Zachara, 2016 [59] Proposed HIDS and used weighted-graph as an anomaly method. 
Misuse detection component uses attack patterns provided by different websites 
contributing to the detection process. 
 
6.    Dimensions of web IDS 
               The IDS tools are generally compared on the basis of performance metrics such as detection coverage, false positive 
rates, etc. [94]. Here, we are interested in comparing the detection systems which are designed exclusively for preventing web-
based attacks on the basis of their design methodology, and the security features and functionalities they offer.  After critically 
and comprehensively reviewing the literature, several dimensions have been recognized so as to compare the existing web IDS 
from multiple perspectives. Each dimension comprises a number of attributes which provide a firm baseline for the comparison. 
The dimensions are briefly described as under: 
 
       6.1. Detection Approach  
 
IDS can be categorized on the basis of detection technique that has been employed to recognize security breaches. 
The detection techniques include anomaly, signature, policy and hybrid approach as discussed earlier in section 2.  
 
      6.2. IDS Type 
 
  IDS can also be categorized into HIDS and NIDS on the basis of its operating layer (application or internet) of 
TCP/IP. HIDS monitors the data flow (in/out) of the terminal upon which IDS has been configured. For the web applications, 
HIDS mostly operates as a reverse proxy and are usually placed on the web server that hosts the website. On the contrary, 
NIDS is deployed at strategic points in the network infrastructure so that it can see the data flowing in the network. Since web 
attacks mostly target application layer and NIDS lacks the information regarding application context, these systems are 
generally not considered as an excellent choice for detecting web application attacks. Furthermore, as already discussed in 
section 3.1, they are not capable of efficiently monitoring the encrypted traffic. 
 
      6.3. Data Monitored Type 
 
  Intrusion detection systems can also be classified according to the kind of data they are inspecting. Several types of 
data being monitored by different IDS are mentioned as under:   
 
      6.3.1 Logs: Most of the detection systems process by analyzing the log files generated by the web server [21]. Logs are 
usually maintained to keep the record of the client request. However, these files do not contain full information of the data that 
is sent to the server from the client such as data passed in HTTP header and POST request. 
 
     6.3.2 HTTP Header: IDS observes the metadata of the request passed in an HTTP header. 
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     6.3.3 GET Request Data: Detection system analyzes those requests which use GET method to send the data to the server. 
In other words, IDS examines the query string contained in the URL. 
 
     6.3.4 POST Request Data: The system analyzes those requests which use POST method to send the data. In the POST 
method, client data is embedded in the message body of a request. These requests allow the users to pass a more substantial 
amount of data to the server. 
 
     6.3.5 Application variables: Web applications consist of a number of server-side programs to process the requests, and 
the application variables are the variables used in these programs. Monitoring these variables make detection approach more 
granular and effective.  
 
      6.3.6 Response Body: It consists of content sent back by the server to the client. It assists the IDS to monitor the flow of 
data from the server to the client, unlike the other data types which are used to control the data flowing from client to server. 
 
      6.4. State 
 
IDS can either be stateful or stateless. As already discussed in section 3.3, the stateless IDS analyzes incoming 
requests independently, whereas the stateful IDS can efficiently understand the relationship between multiple requests. The 
stateful analysis is more powerful and capable of detecting attacks since it can observe the activities within a session. It also 
assists in recognizing the attacks which use a series of requests to exploit the vulnerability. 
 
      6.5. IDS Mode 
 
IDS are supposed to monitor web applications and identify any sign of incidents which try to misuse the applications. 
Upon encountering any abnormal or misleading event, the system usually logs the event or alerts the administrator. These 
systems lack the prevention mechanism. There also exists an enhanced version of the system called Intrusion Prevention 
Mechanism (IPS) which can identify as well as prevent the adversarial activities such as rejecting the current client request, 
blocking the client, etc. [35]. Here, we compare the IDS based on whether they also include prevention mechanism in addition 
to default detection capability. The ability to respond to malicious actions makes the prevention systems more desirable than 
the ones which only detect 
 
      6.6. Response Mechanism 
 
 Response mechanism is the process of taking actions against intrusive activities. It can be either passive or active  
[22]. In passive response, the IDS does not take any corrective step themselves to lessen the damage caused by the attacks. 
Their mere job is to log the security breach and notify the administrator, whereas in the active-response mechanism, the IDS 
can take corrective action in response to the security compromise. The active responses may include blocking the attacker‟s IP 
address, refraining attackers from performing further activities or resuming the service of suspended accounts. The IDS with 
no preventive measures responds passively, whereas the system with the ability to take countermeasures reacts actively. 
Furthermore, active responses can be selected on the basis of either static mapping or dynamic mapping [66]. In the case of 
static mapping, the response is independent of the context of attack and action is triggered based on the predefined rigid 
response-rules. On the other hand, the responses based on dynamic mapping take attack context into consideration and action 
is triggered based on the evaluation of several attack metrics such as severity level, risk, etc. 
 
      6.7. Attack Description  
 
This dimension groups the IDS which provide a description of the attacks on alerts. Characterizing the attacks helps 
the administrator to visualize the intrusion and identify the vulnerabilities existing in the applications.  The information 
obtained from description may also be leveraged to prevent attacks in future. 
 
      6.8. Incremental Learning 
 
Learning in complex and changing environment demands for those systems which can update themselves with the 
change in the application. Hence, the detection systems can also be compared based on whether they can update themselves 
with time, and are impervious to modifications to applications. 
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      6.9. Security Measures 
 
As already discussed in section 4, the security measures offered by existing IDS include input validation, output 
validation, access control, session verification and bot detection. All the detection systems usually do not incorporate all the 
mentioned security measures. So, we can also differentiate the IDS in terms of the kind of security features they are providing. 
7.    Comparison of IDS 
       In this section, we provide a comparative study of the existing web IDS mentioned in the literature from 
identified dimensions. Each IDS has been assessed by a respective set of features of the individual dimension. 
Table 4 shows the comparison of existing systems. 
 
Table 4 Comparison of IDS 
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[52] SD HIDS Logs Stateful Detection Passive No No IV 
AC 
BD 
[47] AD HIDS Logs, Get Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[48] SD HIDS Logs, Get,  
Post, Header 
Stateful Detection Passive No No IV 
AC 
SV 
[55] PD HIDS Get, Post, 
Header 
Stateful Prevention Active 
& 
Dynamic 
Yes No IV 
AC 
[46] HD HIDS Get, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[53] AD HIDS Logs, Get Stateful Detection Passive No No IV 
BD 
[56] SD HIDS Logs Stateful Detection Passive  No No AC 
[51] AD HIDS Logs, Get Stateless Detection Passive Yes  No IV 
[71] AD HIDS Get Stateless Prevention Active 
&  
Dynamic 
No No IV 
 
[50] AD HIDS Application  
Variables 
Stateful Detection Passive No No IV 
AC 
[65] AD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive No Yes IV 
[57] AD NIDS Get, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[12] AD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[42] AD HIDS Get, Post, Stateless Detection Passive No Yes IV 
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Response 
[54] AD HIDS Get Stateless Prevention Active  
& 
Dynamic 
No Yes IV 
AC 
[64] AD NIDS Logs, Get, Post Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[60] AD HIDS Get Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[17] PD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection  Passive No Yes IV 
[58] AD HIDS Get, Post, Header 
 
Stateless Prevention Active 
& 
Dynamic 
No No IV 
[61] AD HIDS Get, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[63] AD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[44] AD NIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive Yes Yes IV 
[49] AD HIDS Application  
Variables 
Stateful Detection Passive No No IV 
AC 
[13] AD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateful Detection Passive No No AC 
SV 
[62] AD NIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive No No IV 
[45] HD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Prevention Active 
& 
Dynamic 
No No IV 
BD 
[18] PD HIDS Get, Post,  
Header, Response 
Stateful Prevention Active  
& 
Static 
Yes No IV 
AC 
SV 
OV 
[14] PD HIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Prevention Active  
& 
Static 
Yes No IV 
[43] AD NIDS Get, Post, Header Stateless Detection Passive Yes No IV 
[59] HD HIDS Get, Post, Header  Stateful Detection Passive No Yes IV 
BD 
AD: Anomaly-based Detection 
SD: Signature-based Detection 
PD: Policy-based Detection 
HD: Hybrid-based Detection 
HIDS: Host-based Intrusion Detection System 
NIDS: Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
IV: Input Validation 
OV: Output Validation 
AC: Access Control 
SV: Session Verification 
BD: Bot Detection 
 
 
Based on the comparison, we evaluate the contribution of each feature to their respective dimension. The state of each 
dimension is illustrated in Figure 1 that illuminates several pertinent facts about the current state of the literature. As clearly 
visible from the detection approach dimension, the representative sample of works (67% of the total) has focussed on 
anomaly-based IDS. Anomaly-based approach assists in developing intelligent IDS with the ability to detect novel attacks as 
well. However, the current research is attracted towards framing either hybrid or policy-based systems. Policy-based systems 
impose a set of rules to establish a balance between the anomaly and misuse detection techniques.  Likewise, hybrid-based 
systems are capable of clubbing the strengths of multiple detection techniques in a way to overcome the limitations of one 
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approach by another. Another dimension, namely IDS type shows that most of the detection systems are host-based (83%) as 
compared to network-based systems (17%). It can be realized from the fact that NIDS is not capable of inspecting HTTPS 
traffic until it has SSL certificate key. NIDS also lacks the context of web application technology. When it comes to security 
measures dimension, the input validation is the leading feature that almost every detection system is providing (93%). 
Inadequate input validation is the prime reason behind most of the applications to be vulnerable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the graph also enlightens the features of several dimensions which need to be highly explored by the 
researchers. For instance, data monitored type dimension shows, only 3% of the systems are monitoring the traffic flowing out 
of the web server. The effect is also reflected in the security measures dimension where 3% IDS offer output validation. As we 
discussed in section 4.2, monitoring the response data refrain the application from exposing sensitive information 
unintentionally. Moreover, the parameter tampering based attacks can only be checked if the IDS watches outflow of data. The 
security measures dimension also reveals that only 13% of systems have been designed to monitor bot activities. According to 
a statistical report on the bot traffic
5
, every third visitor on the website is an attack-bot which indicates how alarming it is for 
the IDS to concentrate on detecting requests from the automated programs.  It is also shown in the graph via state dimension 
that the existing systems have overlooked the tracing of the relationship between different requests, and are more stateless 
(67%) than stateful (33%). The stateless detection system cannot track the behavior of a particular client, and therefore, fails 
them to recognize certain critical malicious behaviors such as session-based attacks and unauthorized access to resources. 
Session hijacking is one of the vulnerabilities leveraged prominently by the hackers to conduct fraud online money 
transactions
6
. According to the 2017 WhiteHat Security report, insufficient authorization is one of the top classes of 
vulnerabilities found as critical. Since stateless systems are not informed of session Ids, they cannot also counteract vigorously 
against the adversaries such as blocking/suspending the offending session or user. They operate at request level, and therefore, 
can only deny the request at maximum as a preventive strategy. 
The graph further illustrates that the prevention mechanism in the IDS has received less attention. The majority of the 
systems are passive (77%), therefore lacks the functionality to take appropriate measures in response to a threat. These systems 
are only concerned with recognizing and reporting the malicious activities. However, identifying an intrusion is just half the 
battle, knowing how to respond is equally essential. Once a suspicious activity has been detected, it is desirable to have an 
                                                 
5
 https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html 
6
 https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2264844/website/pdf/anatomy_of_banking_fraud.pdf?t=1509722403738 
Fig.1. Intrusion Detection System Dimensions 
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automated resource capable of taking appropriate steps to mitigate the damage caused by the attack [96]. The alert description 
dimension shows that the researchers also need to pay attention to the IDS which provides the context of the generated alerts. 
Only 20% systems have been seen with such a feature. Investigation of the alarms raised by the system is an essential task. It 
helps the administrator to get a condensed view of the security issues which assists in studying the cause of the alert, reducing 
the false positive rate, and adopting suitable countermeasures. Therefore, the management of alerts is one of the prevalent 
research fields in the intrusion detection domain [97]. However, for the tasks to be productive, a good deal of information 
regarding alert is needed. It reduces the effort spent by the analyst on delivering timely and effective countermeasures [98]. 
Lack of proper description of alarms makes the task time consuming and resource-intensive. Another dimension which lacks 
the attention of researcher is incremental learning. The systems which adapt to changes are proved to be intelligent enough to 
learn and operate in the complex and dynamic environment. Only one in five IDS is equipped with the dynamic learning 
capability. As we discussed in section 3.4, web applications undergo several changes over time, and therefore it is not 
necessary for the IDS to perform as good in future as it is working at present. Automatic learning capability ensures that the 
profile is up-to-date.  
The fundamental aim of showing this graph is to present the current state of the art in intrusion detection systems for 
web applications. It provides a comparative glance at different existing IDS based on several dimensions.  In a nutshell, the 
graph highlighted the areas where the research efforts are still isolated. It would highly facilitate the researchers and 
academicians to understand the stronger as well as weaker aspects of the domain. 
 
8.    A conceptual framework of IPS for web applications 
 
Although intrusion detection is a well-known methodology in preventing adversarial activities on the network, it is still 
naive in the domain of safeguarding web applications. In section 3, we discussed several challenges which researchers face 
while building the web IDS, and in section 6, we talked several dimensions for comparing the existing IDS. In this section, we 
provide a conceptual framework of an intrusion detection system along with prevention mechanism that caters all the 
challenges being discussed while reviewing the literature. The proposed framework offers the systematic guidance for the 
implementation of the system exclusively for web applications. The AppSensor project of OWASP [89] also presents a 
framework that assists in implementing the IDS for web applications. Thus, to showcase the novelty of the proposed 
framework, we compare its features with the AppSensor framework and one another intrusion detection tool, PHPIDS [90]. 
Since today‟s modern web application firewalls are offering similar security services, the proposed system is also compared 
with three commonly used open source WAFs, namely ModSecurity [91], Shadow Daemon [92] and AQTRONIX WebKnight 
[93]. The proposed IPS acts as a reverse proxy that intercepts both incoming requests and outgoing responses from the client 
and server respectively. Following are given the essential design features of the proposed framework: 
 The framework of proposed IPS adopts hybrid detection approach for utilizing the capabilities of both signatures and 
anomaly-based detection techniques. The signature detection methodology helps to define stringent rules for both 
whitelisting and blacklisting the already known content, and anomaly detection methodology facilitates the detection 
system in learning the normal application behavior.  
 The presented framework follows modular architecture where the whole system is divided into five components, 
namely Preprocessor, Detector, Defender, Logger and Response Controller. Each component is further divided into 
its respective modules and sub-modules.  
 The IPS stores the configuration and behavioural profiles of each web application as per its business logic to 
understand its structure, functionalities, and operations. The configuration steps and building of behavioural profiles 
are explained along with the components of the framework. 
 The IPS also includes the SSL offloading feature to encrypt and decrypt the SSL traffic. It receives both HTTP and 
HTTPS requests, decrypts the content if the request is HTTPS, verify the content and forwards non-malicious requests 
to the server in HTTP format. Similarly, the IPS receives the HTTP responses from the web server, processes the 
content, encrypts the content for HTTPS communication and finally sends it to the client. The preprocessor 
component handles the decryption, whereas response controller component provides the encryption functionality. 
Figure 2 depicts the block diagram of the working of the IPS. Table 5 compares the design features of the proposed one with 
the detection tools mentioned above. The working of each component is discussed in the following sub-sections. 
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 8.1. Preprocessor 
 
A preprocessor is usually the first component of every IDS which is responsible for converting the input data into 
some standard format. However, the proposed preprocessor includes one more functionality whose job is to pass only 
necessary requests to the IDS. In particular to web applications, the HTML response usually contains a number of references to 
the static objects such as images, CSS files, and JavaScript files. When the HTML page is rendered by the web browser, it 
makes separate HTTP request for every single file referred in the page. The IDS should be programmed to ignore such requests 
since the detector has no significant role in monitoring these requests. The practice will significantly reduce the load on IPS 
and enhance the performance of the website.  Therefore, the proposed pre-processor component consists of two modules viz 
Requests Filter and Data Constructor, which are described as under. 
 
      8.1.1 Request Filter: The job of the filter is to prevent those requests from the monitoring mechanism which generated 
while rendering a web page such as image requests, script file requests, etc. These requests can be passed directly to the web 
application for processing. If every request goes through the detector, it may cause unnecessary delay in the loading of a web 
page on the browser.  The Request Filter needs to be trained to learn the requests to be filtered. During the training phase,  
when the application is being accessed under safe environment, the model can be built to learn about the requests  sent from 
the client and the requests submitted on behalf of the application. 
 
      8.1.2 Data Constructor: The requests to be monitored are forwarded to the second module of the Preprocessor, the Data 
Constructor. It prepares the data in a format that will be used by the Detector component for analyzing the requests. It reads the 
raw content of HTTP request and structures it into several fields to be investigated for recognizing a suspicious request such as 
source IP address, the timestamp of the request, HTTP method, URL requested, HTTP headers, cookies, post request data, get 
request data, etc. The module also applies various transformation functions to reduce the variability in the text content such as 
removing extra white spaces, converting the content into the same case (either upper or lower case), decoding the data, etc. The 
transformation functions help the detector in two ways. 1) Enhance its performance by supplying an optimal data, and 2) assist 
in dealing with the IDS evasion techniques like encoding schemes (UTF-8, hex or Unicode
7
, etc.). The sub-module is also 
assigned the task to decrypt the data sent via SSL to inspect the HTTPS request as well. 
In Table 6, we compare the pre-processor component with the other five systems. It can be seen that none of them is 
offering the functionalities of Request Filter module. Instead, they monitor every request which may cause a delay in the 
loading of a web page if the number of static object requests would be high in an HTML page. 
                                                 
7
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Table 5 Comparison of frameworks in terms of their design features 
Feature  AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix 
WebKnight 
Proposed 
IPS 
Detection 
Methodology 
Hybrid Signature 
(Blacklist) 
Policy Signature (Blacklist 
and Whitelist) 
Signature 
(Blacklist) 
Hybrid 
Modular Design Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Application Specific Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SSL offloading Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fig.2. Block Diagram of the IPS working 
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      8.2. Detector 
 
The Detector is the most crucial component of the IDS as it is primarily responsible for determining intrusive requests. 
The job of the Detector is to analyze the HTTP requests from several aspects mainly regarding its content and behavior. The 
functionality of the Detector is divided into five modules, namely Connection Verifier, Bot Detector, Data Validator, User 
Verifier and Access Controller. The modules are serially connected to each other in the specified sequence. If any of the 
modules found a suspicious request, it forwards the request to the Defender component (the component that handles the 
malicious requests), or else to the subsequent module of the Detector for further verification. The working of each module is 
discussed below. 
 
      8.2.1 Connection verifier: It is the first module in the Detector component whose job is to recognize those requests 
which are either originated from the source or destined to the target that has been either blocked or suspended for a particular 
period. The module is implemented via a blacklist of the following objects. 
 The list has a record of sources which are either blocked or suspended for some time being. There are certain cases 
when an application denies the requests from a particular client. For example, once the detector determines the 
requests are coming from a computer program (bot), the IPS may decide to reject further requests from that source. It 
helps in protecting the website from already identified adversaries, site scrapers, or spammers by blocking them or 
suspending them for a specific duration. The blacklist comprises a number of identifying details of the source such as 
the username of the account holder, the session id of the client, IP address, etc. 
 The module also contains a list of services (targets) which are made temporarily/permanent unavailable due to some 
technical or security reasons.  There are specific scenarios when a web application wants to restrict the access to a 
particular service, for example, when the site is under maintenance [75]. 
 Besides, the module also contains the list of files and directories to be prevented from direct access. For instance, 
there can be some sensitive files (such as config file which includes the entire system configuration) or directories 
(such as “includes” directory which generally contains the scripts used in the web pages) for whom the application 
wants to restrict direct access over the web. 
The blacklists of the Connection Verifier module can be maintained either manually by an administrator or by the 
Defender component of the IPS. For instance, once the Defender component decides to block or suspend a specific user session, 
an IP address or a service, it may update the Connection Verifier module to detect subsequent requests for the same. If the 
request passes the Connection Verifier, it is sent to the next module, Bot Detector for further verification, or else is sent to the 
Defender Component to deal with the suspicious request. Table 7 compares the proposed IPS with other five systems from the 
features provided in Connection Verifier. 
 
 
 
      8.2.2 Bot Detector: As already discussed, the HTTP requests may also be issued by some software programs. The main 
task of this module is to determine whether the requests have been issued from a human or an automated program. It is to be 
noted that not all bots are bad. There are certain good bots such as GoogleBot [76] which are necessary for increasing the 
ranking of a website in search engines.  In order to detect malicious bots, the module needs to understand how to differentiate 
between humans, good bots and bad bots. Therefore, the Bot Detector module comprises three sub-modules. In the first sub-
module, the requests sent by non-malicious bots are filtered based on their IP addresses that specify the address of the web 
Table 6 Comparison of Preprocessor component feature with others 
Module AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IDS 
Request Filter No No No No No Yes 
Data Constructor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 7 Comparison of Connection Verifier module features with others 
Security Features AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Blacklist blocked 
/suspended source 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Blacklist blocked 
/suspended target 
No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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hosting services used to generate bot traffic. There are websites which provide the address of the bots to be whitelisted
8
. It is 
mainly the job of the administrator to form the list of IP addresses of the permitted bots.  The request sent from non-malicious 
bots are forwarded to next module of the Detector, the Data Validator for further verification of suspiciousness, otherwise, 
passed to the subsequent sub-module of Bot Detector. 
In the second sub-module, the IP address along with various header details such as user-agent are examined to 
identify the requests from bad bots. User-agent contains information regarding the browser and the technology used to access 
the website. There are several websites which publish the user-agent and IP addresses of the known malicious web robots [72, 
73]. If the request passes through the second sub-module, it enters the third sub-module where the behavioral analysis of the 
request is carried out. 
 Technical details of a request are not enough to distinguish a bot activity from the human. One of the reasons is that 
bots can easily hide their identities by using spoofed values of the request elements and bypass the second sub-module. Hence, 
there is a third sub-module that monitors the behavioral patterns of the incoming requests to spot them. The sub-module is first 
trained to learn the normal usage of an application. It uses a combination of distinguishing characteristics to determine the 
likelihood of a request being sent from an automated agent. Various signs signify the use of bots on an application. Foremost is 
the request rate. Bots generally issue HTTP requests at a much faster rate than a human. By tracking the IP address of the client 
and analyzing the average speed with which it is sending requests, the module can detect a bot. Next parameter can be the 
number of requests sent from an IP address in a particular duration since bots can generate thousands of requests in a short 
period. The navigational pattern can also be used to serve the purpose since the website is accessed differently by bots. The 
number of hits that generate errors is another feature, as a bot looking for application flaws tend to generate a significant 
amount of 404 pages. Other characteristics used to identify the bot traffic include types of resources requested, the time 
interval between queries, coverage of the web application, etc. [69, 70, 71]. If the request is found malicious, it is sent to the 
Defender component to take appropriate actions. The Defender may decide to block or suspend the source to deny the further 
requests. The component will make the required changes in the blacklist of the Connection Verifier. The systematic diagram of 
the working of the Bot Detector module is shown below in Figure 3. 
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Table 8 shows the comparison of the security features provided by the Bot Detector with the other systems. The signature-
based tools including PHPIDS, Shadow Daemon and Aqtronix WebKnight lack the functionality to monitor the behavior of 
requests. Besides, both PHPIDS and Shadow Daemon do not also track the IP addresses. In the case of the AppSensor 
framework, there is no security policy which whitelists the good bots. ModSecurity is the only tool that provides all the 
features but it requires the administrator to specify the malicious behavior of the bots in the form of rules, on the contrary, we 
proposed sub-module 3 that uses machine learning techniques to learn malicious behavior.  
 
Table 8  Comparison of Bot Detector module features with others. 
Bot Detector 
Module 
AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Sub-module 1 No No Yes No No Yes 
Sub-module 2 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Sub-module 3 Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Fig.3. Working of the Bot Detector module 
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 8.2.3 Data Validator: This module secures the websites from the attacks which exploit the vulnerabilities proliferated due to 
the improper implementation of input validation. The module validates the client data including the header, query string and 
form data. Before validating any value, the module first determines the type of the input parameter. From the characteristics of 
values, the module distributes the parameters into six categories, namely text, numeric, enumerated, format-specific, web 
address and application parameters. Based on the type of input parameters, the values are validated. The validation schemes of 
different parameters are discussed as follows: 
 Since text parameters can contain an indefinite set of values, they are verified using the blacklist which includes the 
signatures of already known attacks such as SQL injection and XSS-based attacks in order to ensure that the value 
does not contain any potential malicious string. The blacklist is created manually and needs to be updated as the new 
attack pattern arrives on the web.  
 For numeric category, the Validator module puts the request in the suspicious class if the parameter contains non-
numeric values.  
 The enumerated parameters assume values from a pre-defined set which are validated using white-list. Manually, it is 
not possible to create white-lists for all the input fields since each white-list will have a different set of values and the 
number of input fields can be many depending on the business logic of the application. However, machine learning 
techniques can be used to train the Validator to learn the set of values and generate the individual white-list. In paper 
[53], the author discovers the parameters that can have limited number of values by determining if the number of 
distinct values of the parameters is bounded by some threshold, and builds the set of legitimate values for such 
parameters.  
 Similarly, for the format-specific category also, machine learning can be applied to learn the structure of the values 
and generate the pattern for verifying the parameters. For example, the authors in the paper [47] capture the structure 
of the parameter values by learning the distribution of relative character frequencies. 
 The parameter which contains a web address (i.e., a URL), is primarily verified to prevent the application from 
unvalidated redirects and forwards vulnerability threats. Some web applications include code that redirects the user to 
another web page of the same domain or different domain based on the client side parameter. Here, the Validator 
needs to ensure that the parameters do not contain any malicious or unwanted link of a web page. The best possible 
way to prevent such attacks is to sanitize the input by using the whitelist that has the details of all trusted URLs [99]. 
The list of valid URLs can either be configured manually or generated via machine learning techniques by learning 
the valid URLs space from trusted traffic during the training phase.  
 The last category, application is comprised of parameters whose values have been initialized by server-side programs 
and must not be modified while transmitted back from the client. The Validator module takes the help from Response 
Controller component of IPS to validate these values. The Response Controller marks the values which are set by 
application and store the hash of these values in a list. The Data Validator then uses this list to verify whether the 
values are altered or not. Table 9 contains the description of each of the parameter categories along with their 
validation scheme.   
Table 9 Description of parameter categories 
Parameter 
category 
Description Examples Validating Scheme 
Text Holds both letters and numbers in the 
indeterminate range. 
Username= John Smith 
Address= Celeste Slater 606-
3727, Roseville NH11523 
Blacklist of prohibited 
content 
Numeric Holds only numbers. Id=1254, Age=23 Ensuring valid data type 
Enumerated Consist of values of a fixed set of 
elements defined by the application 
business logic. 
Gender={„male‟,‟female‟,‟other‟} 
Married={„yes‟,‟no‟} 
White-list of allowed 
values 
Format-
Specific  
The values which follow a rigid pattern. Date=  Nov 4, 2003 8:14 PM 
Time=  8:14:11 PM 
White-list of valid patterns 
Website 
address 
Holds URL as a value. Target=www.partnersite.com 
Fwd=appadmin.jsp 
White-list of valid URLs 
Application  The values which are set by application 
and must not be tampered at the client 
side. 
JSESSIONID=ABAD1D 
Price=12.3 
A list containing hashes of 
these values 
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If any of the client-side values fails the Validator checks, the request is sent to the Defender component. Depending 
on the severity of the malicious request, the Defender may reject the request or pass the request to the application by just 
logging the event details. Table 10 represents the availability of these features in other detection systems. The tools, PHPIDS, 
ModSecurity and Aqtronix WebKnight are not concerned about the context of the parameters. Their architecture does not 
support the way through which different fitter rules can be designed for different types of parameters.  
 
 
 
8.2.4 User Verifier: The attacker can also exploit the web flaws to impersonate a user and make requests on his behalf. User 
Verifier module monitors the activities of the user to ensure that the owner of the account is issuing requests. The module 
contains two sub-modules for detecting session impersonation attacks. The first sub-module examines various session related 
details such as the number of login attempts, IP address, user-agent, the idle period, anti-CSRF token value, etc. to prevent an 
attacker from accessing the web application by using another user identity. The user can be treated as suspicious if he 
successively fails in logging into his account. The use of different IP addresses and User-agents for the two requests of the 
same session may raise the doubt of the session being used by more than one user. Similarly, the session can be made expire 
after a suitable period of inactivity to tighten the security as it would give the attacker a smaller window of opportunity to get a 
valid session identifier. The anti-CSRF token is a random value which can be added by the Response Controller component of 
the IPS to the response body as a hidden field in the HTML form or as a query string parameter in the links. When a client 
issues a request, the sub-module examines whether it includes the embedded token and has the same value. Examining the anti-
CSRF tokens would prevent the application from Cross-Site Request Forgery-based attacks [82]. If the request fails any of the 
checks specified in the first submodule, it is forwarded to Defender Component for further action, or else is sent to next sub-
module of the User Verifier. 
 The mitigation approach used by the first sub-module to detection of session impersonation will significantly fail for 
two major reasons. 1) The victim may use public IP address which multiple machines may share including the attacker, and 2) 
The attacker may spoof IP address, user-agent and other details of the victim. Therefore, the second sub-module analyzes the 
user behavior and detects the attacks by inspecting the significant changes in the behavior of the session being operated. The 
module monitors the set of actions based on the premise that masquerader will perform operations that sufficiently deviate 
from the typical profile behavior of the victim. The module is first trained to distinguish legitimate user behavior from the 
malicious one. Different behavioral characteristics such as time of the session, kind of activities performed on the application, 
the frequency of the requests, request sequences, temporal dependencies among requests, etc. [77, 78, 79, 80] can be used for 
user profiling. If the request conforms to the established user profile, it is sent to next module of the detector, the Access 
Controller, otherwise to the Defender. Moreover, on a valid request, the module gets the new data which is used to update the 
corresponding user profile. In the case of session impersonation, the Defender may make the user immediately log out of the 
application and notify the account holder about the security breach. It may also suspend the account or in certain critical 
security applications (e.g., online banks) even make the account disabled until the user activates it through some out-of-band-
steps such as telephoning the customer support. Figure 4 shows the working of sub-modules of User Verifier. Table 11 
compares the other detection tools where it can be seen that no detection system is profiling the user behavior. 
  
Table 10 Comparison of Data Validator module features with others 
Validated 
Parameter Type 
AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Text Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Numeric No No No Yes No Yes 
Enumerated Yes No No No No Yes 
Format-specific No No No Yes No Yes 
Website Address Yes No No No No Yes 
Application  Yes No No No No Yes 
Fig.4. Working of the User Verifier Module 
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      8.2.5 Access controller: Improper implementation of access control checks in the application may enable the adversaries 
to get unauthorized access to the privileged services (e.g. display credentials of all users) or resources (e.g. files, databases) 
[83]. This module primarily ensures that the requests to the operations and resources have been made in an authorized context. 
The Access Controller is comprised of three sub-modules, namely two-factor (2F) authenticator, role-based access controller 
(RBAC) and behaviour analyser that work in a sequence to recognize the unauthorized requests. 
2F authentication is a security process that requires a user to provide the second piece of identifying information in 
addition to the password as the second step of verification
9
. It is a recommended practice for ensuring security to sensitive 
operations like an online transaction. The 2F authenticator sub-module inspects the requests to see whether it is for any critical 
service. The request for a sensitive operation is sent to the Defender where it prompts the user to enter the second 
authentication factor such as OTP. If the user supplies the valid credentials, the request is passed to the web server, otherwise 
rejected. The administrator may provide the list of sensitive operations to the module. If the request is not for a sensitive 
operation, it is passed to the second sub-module, RBAC.  
Role-based access control is commonly used to manage the access control policies for web application [86]. In web 
application, each user is assigned a particular role (admin, member, visitor, etc.) which governs his privileges. The RBAC sub-
module consists of a mapping of different roles assigned by the application to their respective set of permitted operations, and 
assess the requests based on some predefined rules for determining if the user has right to invoke the functionality.  The sub-
module is usually configured by the administrator. For large and complex web applications, the administrator may mistakenly 
forget to enlist some web operations in the policies. Therefore, the client request is verified against two conditions, first, if the 
requested operation is mentioned in the policies and second, if client‟s role is permitted to access the operation. If both the 
conditions are met, the request is finally considered as safe by all the modules of the Detector and so, the request is sent to the 
application for the processing. If the request fails to meet the second condition, the user is considered as unauthorized, and 
hence, the request is sent to the Defender. If the request violates the first condition i.e. the requested service is not even 
mentioned in the policies, it is passed to third sub-module for further verification.  
The configuration of RBAC sub-module is mainly the responsibility of administrator, and therefore, is likely to be 
flawed. There can be services which the RBAC sub-module do not mention. The requests for such services are passed to the 
behavioral analyzer which is a machine learning-based sub-module. Various features such as the pattern of requested services 
and resources can help to build the role-based access behavioral profiles [81]. The submodule can also learn the resources 
which should not be directly accessible from the user to prevent insecure direct object reference vulnerability. The safe 
requests are sent to the web server, otherwise to the Defender component of the IPS. The behavioral analyzer may also assist 
the administrator to identify the flaws in the RBAC model as it points out the resources which are accessed by users but not 
mentioned in RBAC. The Figure 5 shows the working of the sub-modules and Table 12 provides the comparison. 
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Table 11 Comparison of User Verifier module features with others 
User Verifier 
Module 
AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Sub-module 1 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Sub-module 2 No No No No No Yes 
Fig.5. Working of the Access Controller module 
24 
 
    
  
 
8.3. Defender 
 
 
      8.4. Response Controller 
 
Response Controller intercepts the output to be sent to the client by the server to prevent any disclosure of critical and sensitive 
information, and also to keep the record of the data stored by the application in HTTP response. This component has three 
modules, namely Transformer, Marker and Encryptor. The following section briefly discusses the function of each module. 
 
      8.4.1 Transformer: This module performs two operations. First, it serves alternate content if there is any leaked 
information in the output and second, it embeds secret details (e.g., an anti-csrf token) in the response body. Application 
weakness such as improper server configurations and handling of error messages may reveal various sensitive information in 
the response body like technical details of the server, directory structure, etc [85]. The module replaces such information with 
some generic content. The module may use the pre-defined patterns for identifying the leaked information. Next, the module 
also appends an anti-csrf token to the HTTP response either as a form parameter or as a query string in the links to prevent 
session management related attacks. The token is later verified by the User Verifier module of the Detector component when 
the data is sent back to the server upon subsequent request. 
 
      8.4.2 Marker: This module assists the Detector component in encountering the parameter manipulation attacks. Its job is 
to generate the list that contains the records of the parameters that have been used by the application to store data on the client 
side. The Marker creates the hash [74] of such parameter values, form a list and supply it to the detector. The hash value assists 
in verifying the integrity of data content sent through insecure channels. When the data is submitted back, the Data Validator 
Table 12 Comparison of Access Controller module features with others 
Access Controller 
Module 
AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
2F Authenticator No No No No No Yes 
RBAC Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Behavioral 
Analyzer 
No No No No No Yes 
Once a suspicious request is detected, the next step is to decide how to deal with it. The Defender component takes 
appropriate countermeasures to prevent the website from adversarial operations in real time. The component is coupled with a 
set of response measures for translating the passive alert generated by the detector into automated actions. The response action 
is selected dynamically on the basis of various attack characteristics such as the nature of the attack, severity level, confidence 
level, etc. [67, 68]. Severity signifies the impact of damage to the targeted application and confidence level indicates the 
probability of the reported incident to be an attack. The detector component provides these values. For instance, in the case of 
session hijacking, the defender may forcefully log off the session and notify the account holder. An injection attack with high 
confidence and high severity (e.g., attempt to execute critical administrator operations) may cause the blocking of the user, 
whereas the attack with high confidence and low severity (e.g., just looking for vulnerability) would only cause the rejection 
of the current request. Moreover, for an intrusion with low confidence and low severity, the defender may log the incident and 
pass the request to the application for processing. Furthermore, upon recognizing the abnormal behavior with low confidence, 
the defender may decide to monitor the future requests over time and take appropriate action once the confidence level 
becomes higher. The possible actions that the defender component may initiate includes disabling the user account, disabling 
the compromised services, recording the incident, rejecting the current request, suspending the service, making the user 
logged out, suspending the user, blocking the IP address, suspending the IP address, etc.  It is to be noted that the component 
will also update the black-list of Connection Verifier component to suspend or block the attacker, compromised services or 
resources. The Table 13 shows which of the detection tools is offering the functionalities of the Defender Component. Since 
PHPIDS and Aqtronix WebKnight operate in passive mode, they are mainly concerned with logging the records.  
 
Table 13 Comparison of Defender component features with others 
IPS Component AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Defender Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
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re-computes the hash of those values and compare with the hashes mentioned in the list (see section 8.2.3). The parameters 
used by the application to store values may be observed while training of the Data Validator module. During the training phase, 
the module can learn about the parameters which are initialized by the server side programs, and their values remain the same 
when submitted back to the server. The administrator may also provide the list of parameters to be marked. 
 
      8.4.3 Encryptor: Its main job is to encrypt the traffic for HTTPS communication. As discussed, the proposed IPS also 
provides the SSL offloading functionality to deal with the HTTPS request. The pre-processor component of the IPS converts 
the HTTPS requests into HTTP format, and the Encryptor sub-module is assigned the task to convert HTTP response to 
HTTPS if required. The Encryptor module can also be configured to provide security to HTTP communication.  In the case of 
HTTP response, sensitive details such as cookies may need to be prevented from being seen by the client. This sub-module, if 
configured, can encrypt these values as well. When the subsequent request from the client returns these values, the pre-
processor component can decrypt them. 
 
      8.5. Logger  
The component works with two modules, namely the Defender Logger and Response Controller Logger to log the 
operations performed by Defender and Response Controller components respectively. The Defender is responsible for taking 
counter-measures against the suspicious incidents. The Defender Logger maintains details of the suspicious request as well as 
the action performed by Defender in response to suspicious activity. It logs all the relevant information of the attack incident 
such as username, IP address, time, type of attack, severity, requested URL, etc. The processing of these log records will help 
the administrator in analyzing the major threats on the application, tracking the intrusion as well as an intruder and assessing 
the performance of Detector and Defender components. 
Similarly, another module maintains the details of the operations performed by the Response controller on the content 
sent to the client. The Response Controller broadly applies three functions on the response data, i.e., replace the potentially 
leaked information with some non-harmful content, marks the fields which are set by application programs and encryption. 
The details of these operations must be logged for analyzing and improving the performance of the Response Controller. Log 
details will help to ensure no critical value is sent in the plain text. Likewise, logs will also assist in tracking whether the 
component marks all the parameters set by the server side programs. If it is found that some parameters have been missed out 
by the Response Controller, appropriate changes can be made in its respective module. Moreover, the log details may also 
provide insight into the weaknesses of the application which leak the information.  
Table 15 presents the comparison between the systems. It can be noted that the existing systems are mainly focussed 
on logging the details of the suspicious requests. But the Logger component also tracks the actions performed by the system on 
the content to be sent to the client.   
 
 
The complete framework of IPS is shown in Figure 6. The framework has been designed to ensure the high-level 
security to the application. Some of the distinguishing features of the IPS are summarized as under: 
 
           Table 14 compares the detection systems with respect to the Response Controller features. We observed that only 
ModSecurity is controlling the HTTP response. However, it requires stringent rule specifications to serve the purpose. On the 
other hand, the Marker module of proposed IPS that assists in dealing with parameter tampering attacks can be trained via 
machine learning. 
 
Table 14 Comparison of Response Controller component features with others 
Response Controller 
Module  
AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Encryptor No No Yes No No Yes 
Marker Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Transformer No No Yes No No Yes 
Table 15 Comparison of Logger component features with others 
Logger Module AppSensor PHPIDS ModSecurity Shadow Daemon Aqtronix WebKnight Proposed IPS 
Defender Logger Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Response 
Controller Logger 
No No No No No No 
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 The Request Filter module of the Preprocessor component is novel in terms of functionality. 
 The Detector module is equipped with a new set of features such as validating all types of parameter category and 
maintaining the profile of user behavior and access behavior. 
 Response Controller Logger module is also unique in the proposed framework that tracks the actions performed by 
the system on HTTP response content. 
 ModSecurity is the only tool that provides the maximum of the proposed features, but it requires the administrator to 
specify malicious behavior in the form of rules, whereas there are some modules in proposed IPS which use machine 
learning techniques to learn it. 
However, it should be noted that there are certain limitations of the proposed framework of IPS. It just 
strengthens the security but does not eliminate the need for all security practices. For instance, it does not replicate the 
security provided by HTTPS communication. It won‟t encrypt the sensitive information coming from the client side. 
Therefore, if the user credentials are submitted to the server using HTTP protocol, the details can be intercepted by an 
attacker. Similarly, the framework does not have any hand in dealing with the issue of integrity of the client-side data. 
Furthermore, it does not eliminate the need for server-side validations. Input is validated only from the perspective of 
attacks only. It does not implement the application logic for verifying the values such as the uniqueness of username, 
the validity of the email, etc. Password quality is another issue which is not enforced by the IPS and can endanger the 
user security if the application permits its users to create easy, predictable and weak passwords. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.6. Framework of the proposed IPS 
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9. Conclusion  
Web application threats have become a prime concern for information security. IDS is one of the security mechanisms 
used to guard these applications against attacks. However, the methodology has been primarily used for monitoring the 
network-based attacks. Designing a suitable IDS to prevent web-based attacks still needs more focus by the interest groups. 
The paper provides all the essential information about the web IDS at a single place as a recipe to design an ideal intrusion 
detection system. In this paper, we have listed many particular characteristics of a web application which makes challenging 
for a developer to build an efficient detection system.  For example, HTTPS traffic makes the detector incapable of reading 
packet data if concerned SSL certificate is not provided. Web request parameter values are of various types such as text value, 
application value, format-specific value, etc., which requires the detector to use different validation approach for different 
types. Web applications facilitate multiple user interactions through sessions, and the IDS which do not track the user requests 
are not efficient enough to recognize attacks on session management and authorization policies. A web application can be 
implemented in various programming languages, and since NIDS inspects packets, it is independent of programming language, 
whereas HIDS are usually server-side language specific. Since software can also be used to generate HTTP requests, IDS 
should be capable of detecting bot requests. SIDS suits best for detecting scripts which are designed to automate web-based 
attacks, whereas the AIDS suits best for detecting scripts designed to mimic human behavior. Sound knowledge of all the 
discussed characteristics will assist in designing a robust architecture of the web IDS. 
The paper also presents the evolution of the research work carried so far towards designing the intrusion detection 
systems for a web application. Several dimensions have been proposed to compare the existing detection systems on different 
parameters such as IDS type, IDS mode, data monitored type, response mechanism, etc. The overall comparative study has 
been summarized in terms of a graph which highlights various prominent facts about the current trends and the challenges in 
the domain.  The graph revealed that a few IDS are providing features such as output validation, stateful detection, prevention 
mechanism, dynamic learning and description of attacks. In fact, none of the systems mentioned in our survey guarantee to 
immune an application from all kinds of web attacks. Furthermore, a conceptual framework for an ideal web IPS has been 
proposed. The framework comprises of five components, namely Preprocessor, Detector, Defender, Logger and Response 
Controller The features of the framework have been compared with five well-known detection systems, namely AppSensor, 
PHPIDS, ModSecurity, Shadow Daemon and AQTRONIX WebKnight.  
10.    Future Scope 
The review conducted in the paper would prove to be extremely beneficial in identifying future avenues in the 
research domain of intrusion detection for a web application. We are on track to design a well-defined set of the guidelines for 
each component discussed in the framework that will assist developers and researchers to build an efficient IPS for the web 
application and subsequently implement them. The future of web IDS is a system that can learn custom attacks against an 
application, provide broader attack detection coverage, respond in real time and update itself over time.  
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